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The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, Soft Law, and the Procedural Rule of Law
By Jodi Lazare*
Introduction
Since their first release in 2005, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines have
become a basic element of the practice of Canadian family law. 1 Using one of two
formulas, the Advisory Guidelines produce ranges of both amount and duration of support.

* Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. This is an early
draft of an article that appears in volume 31:2 of Canadian Journal of Women and the
Law. It was first presented at an emerging scholars workshop held by the Canadian
Journal of Women and the Law and the Osgoode Institute of Feminist Legal Studies, 2223 September 2017. I am grateful for the thoughtful feedback of the workshop
participants and to the organizers, Kim Brooks and Sonia Lawrence. This research is
based in my part on my doctoral dissertation, supported by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, and by the McGill University Faculty of Law. I
am thankful to Robert Leckey, Angela Campbell, Daniel Jutras, Richard Devlin, and H.
Archibald Kaiser, for their comments on earlier drafts, to Nayha Acharya, for stimulating
and challenging conversations about the rule of law, and to three anonymous reviewers,
for their valuable suggestions.
1

Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice, Spousal Support Advisory

Guidelines by Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson (Ottawa: Department of Justice,
Canada, 2008): <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/index.html>
[Advisory Guidelines].
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Importantly, they do not replace the exercise of judicial discretion; judges must still select
from the ranges, in addition to determining whether they are applicable at all.2 Although
they have no formal legal status — they are neither legislated nor referred to in the relevant
legislation — lawyers and judges regularly look to them for guidance in structuring spousal
support claims and awards following the breakdown of a family. 3 Further, while the
Advisory Guidelines were commissioned by the federal Department of Justice, they do not
stem from government; they were devised by two family law professors, in consultation
with a committee of experts.
Despite their unofficial status, the popularity of the Advisory Guidelines among
legal actors is evidenced in their endorsement by several of the country’s courts of appeal;
British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario, New Brunswick, PEI, and
Newfoundland and Labrador have, to varying degrees, approved of their content and utility
in assisting with complex discretionary determinations.4 Other jurisdictions, however, have

2

The Advisory Guidelines set out one formula for situations where there is a concurrent

child support obligation and one for situations of spousal support alone. Further, they
contain a list of exceptional situations, in which departing from the formulas is
recommended.
3

The broad statutory grant of discretion in awarding spousal support is contained in the

Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), ss 15.2(4)(6) [Divorce Act].
4

See e.g. Yemchuk v Yemchuk, 2005 BCCA 406; Scott v Scott, 2011 MBCA 21; Linn v

Frank, 2014 SKCA 87 [Linn v Frank]; Fisher v Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11 [Fisher]; JDM v
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not demonstrated the same openness to the Advisory Guidelines. Judges in Quebec,
Alberta, and Nova Scotia ground their resistance to the Advisory Guidelines in their
informal, unofficial, and non-binding nature. 5 In those provinces, litigants continue to
endure disparate treatment in the face of similar facts. As a result, the unpredictability and
sense of injustice that provided the impetus for the creation of the Advisory Guidelines
continue to undermine the family law system.6 This article responds to that resistance.
Part 1 introduces the Advisory Guidelines. It briefly explains the reasons for looking
to guidelines in an area of law characterized by a broad grant of judicial discretion and
details the process of their creation. That process underlies the subsequent argument that
judicial reliance on the Advisory Guidelines might be understood as corresponding with
constitutional principles. Part 1 also sets out the theoretical framework embedded in the
Advisory Guidelines, suggesting that by incorporating a relational approach to marriage
and its breakdown, as set out by the Supreme Court interpreting the relevant legislation,
they may be viewed as an important tool in the pursuit of substantive gender equality.

KDM, 2015 PECA 16; SC v JC, 2006 NBCA 46 [SC v JC]; Broaders v Boland Broaders,
2017 NLCA 2.
5

See Neighbour v Neighbour, 2014 ABCA 62 [Neighbour]; Sawatzky v Sawatzky, 2008

ABCA 355 [Sawatsky]; Strecko v Strecko, 2014 NSCA 66 [Strecko]; MacDonald v
MacDonald, 2017 NSCA 18 [MacDonald]; Droit de la famille — 14165, 2014 QCCS
402 [DF — 14165].
6

See Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support Post-Bracklow: The Pendulum Swings Again?”

(2001) 19 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 185 [Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow”].
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Part 2 draws on administrative law scholarship to characterize the Advisory
Guidelines as an instrument of soft law, akin to the guidelines and policy instrument
regularly relied on to structure discretion, within government and beyond. Drawing on the
relevant case law, it then sets out the judicial objection to reliance on the Advisory
Guidelines when disputes reach the courtroom. With this background in mind, Part 2
suggests that much like attitudes toward administrative soft law, resistance to the Advisory
Guidelines is rooted in constitutional concerns related to the separation of powers and the
principle of the rule of law. In unpacking judicial objections to the Advisory Guidelines
and connecting them with concerns about the rule of law, Part 2 responds to the call to
“[bring] soft law out of the constitutional shadows.”7
Part 3 offers a response to the rule of law concerns raised by judicial reliance on
the Advisory Guidelines. It suggests that opposition grounded in legitimacy concerns is
rooted in a thin, formal conception of the constitutional principle. It argues that recognition
of the normative force of the Advisory Guidelines, and novel regulatory tools like them,
might correspond with a richer, procedural conception of the rule of law, according to
which, legitimacy stems not from the form or source of a particular regulatory instrument,
but rather, from the procedure followed in its creation. This part thus challenges the idea
that constitutionally legitimate regulatory techniques can only stem from the legislature.
Instead, it posits that the Advisory Guidelines, and soft law tools like them, offer alternative
ways of promoting meaningful participation and democracy.

7

Lorne Sossin, “Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft Law” (2002)

45:4 Canadian Public Administration 465 at 465 [Sossin, “Discretion Unbound”].
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1. Introducing the Advisory Guidelines
This part briefly develops the historical context that gave rise to a perceived need
for the Advisory Guidelines, as well as the process of their creation, as that process informs
this paper’s response to concerns about the legitimacy of judicial reliance on them. It also
sets out the theoretical framework underlying the Advisory Guidelines, in order to suggest
that they function as a tool to promote substantive gender equality.
1.1. Remedying inconsistency in spousal support “from the ground up”
The Advisory Guidelines were created in an attempt to remedy the inconsistent and
unpredictable nature of spousal support awards, granted through the exercise of broad
judicial discretion. In 1992, the Supreme Court, interpreting the relevant provisions of the
Divorce Act, set out a compensatory model of spousal support, according to which support
is an earned entitlement for spouses, typically women, who sacrificed economic prospects
for the sake of their families.8 Seven years later, the Court confirmed the existence of a
competing approach to the remedy — non-compensatory, or needs-based support, even in
the absence of a compensatory claim.9 Because of their combined effect of broadening
entitlement to spousal support, the two decisions constituted a victory for women, who
were recognized as enduring harsh and gendered financial effects upon divorce.10 But the
existence of competing approaches to support, coupled with the broad grant of judicial
discretion in the Divorce Act, meant that the remedy was not living up to its potential to

8

See Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813 [Moge].

9

See Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 [Bracklow].

10

See Moge, supra note 8.
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improve the fate of divorcing women. Instead, spousal support law was characterized by
inconsistency, unpredictability, and a resulting sense or arbitrariness.11
The 2008 release of the final version of the Advisory Guidelines was preceded by
seven years of consultations with the family law bar and judiciary across Canada. 12
Building “from the ground up,” the authors worked with “an advisory group of family
lawyers, judges, and mediators who drew upon their experience of spousal support
outcomes in negotiations, mediations, and settlement conferences.”13 The advisory group
was composed of 15 individuals, from eight provinces, whose experiences ranged from

11

See Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow”, supra note 6; Carol Rogerson, “The Canadian Law of

Spousal Support” (2004) 38:1 Family Law Quarterly 69. See also Nicholas Bala,
“Judicial Discretion and Family Law Reform in Canada” (1986) 5:1 Canadian Journal of
Family Law 15 (on the general harms of judicial discretion in determining spousal
support).
12

See Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, “The Canadian Experiment with Spousal

Support Guidelines” (2011) 45:2 Family Law Quarterly 241 at 250 [Rogerson &
Thompson, “Canadian Experiment”]. Note that the push for spousal support guidelines
dates further back than 2001. As early as 1992, Carol Rogerson wrote about the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in spousal support determinations and the need for
guidelines to help mitigate those difficulties. See “Evidentiary Issues in Spousal Support
Cases”, in Special Lectures of Law Society of Upper Canada, 1991, Applying the Law of
Evidence: Tactics and Techniques for the Nineties (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) 219.
13

Rogerson & Thompson, supra note 12 at 250.
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private family law practice, the non-profit sector, professional leadership roles, and the
bench.14 The group met several times during the lead-up to the release of the Advisory
Guidelines in draft form, with a view to securing consensus on all aspects of the project.
Moreover, it was essential that the authors of the Advisory Guidelines hear the input and
diverse voices of those with “on-the-ground experience” with spousal support.15
The release of the first draft of the Advisory Guidelines was followed by a second
stage of “discussion, experimentation, feedback and revision.”16 This stage included crosscountry tours, during which the authors spoke with groups of lawyers and judges, and
sought feedback through focused discussions with small groups of stakeholders.17 They
also received written comments from the public, individual lawyers, and bar associations.18
The advisory group also continued to meet and reflect on the project during this stage.19
Thus, the Advisory Guidelines offer a unique example of a tool developed outside of
government, but aimed at facilitating the statutorily mandated granting of the spousal
support remedy.

14

Advisory Guidelines, supra note 1 at 157.

15

Ibid at 17.

16

Ibid at 18.

17

Ibid at 19-20.

18

Ibid at 20.

19

Ibid at 20.
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1.2. The Advisory Guidelines and substantive gender equality
This article is anchored in the feminist legal pursuit of substantive economic gender
equality, as it is premised on the belief that judicial consideration of the Advisory
Guidelines helps promote the objective of economic equality, as set out in the relevant
provisions of the Divorce Act.20 This is so with respect to both the procedure and substance
of the spousal support remedy. Where procedure is concerned, Carol Rogerson, co-author
of the Advisory Guidelines, explains that they were meant to respond to the atmosphere of
uncertainty surrounding discretionary spousal support determinations. Prior to their
release, “[lawyers] had difficulty predicting outcomes, thus impeding their ability to advise
legal clients and to engage in cost-effective settlement negotiations. And for [individuals]
without legal representation or in weak bargaining positions, support claims were often
simply not pursued.”21 As women earn less than their male partners,22 they make up the

20

Supra note 3.

21

Carol Rogerson, “Shaping Substantive Law to Promote Access to Justice: Canada’s

Use of Child and Spousal Support Guidelines” in John Eekelaar, Mavis Maclean &
Benoit Bastard, eds, Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2015) 51 at 62 [Rogerson, “Access to Justice”].
22

See Vanier Institute of the Family, “Families Count: Profiling Canada’s Families” at

102-103 (in 2007, women were primary earners in only 28 per cent of dual-income
couples).
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majority of spousal support claimants.23 Thus, in fostering predictability and creating a
baseline for spousal support negotiations,24 the Advisory Guidelines may function as a tool
for more women to access economic justice following family breakdown.25

23

See Canada, Department of Finance Canada, Equality and Growth: A Strong Middle

Class, (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 27 February 2018) at 274 (the majority of family
support recipients are women).
24

See Robert H Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:

The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88:5 Yale Law Journal 950; Craig Martin, “Unequal
Shadows: Negotiation Theory and Spousal Support Under Canadian Divorce Law”
(1998) 56:1 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 135.
25

In characterizing the spousal support remedy as feminist in nature, this paper

acknowledges that that view is not without its detractors, many of whom suggest that the
privatization of ongoing financial obligations to former spouses risks reinforcing and
perpetuating women’s economic dependence on men. See e.g. Colleen Sheppard,
“Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons From Moge” (1995) 12:2
Can J Fam L 238; Beverley Baines, “But Was She a Feminist Judge?” in Kim Brooks, ed,
Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 345;
Brenda Cossman, “Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the
Reprivatization Project” in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and
the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169. This paper
is premised on the idea that conceiving of spousal support from a relational perspective,

10
With respect to their content, or substance, the Advisory Guidelines can be read as
promoting substantive equality. Scholars have written that Canada’s spousal support law
is grounded in a relational theory of marriage and marriage breakdown — one that
recognizes that people are inherently social.26 Enmeshed as we are in social connections
and relationships — especially those as intimate as marriage — the law recognizes that
these connections might give rise to “nonconsensual” obligations.27 The spousal support
remedy set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, by sanctioning the subsistence of mutual
obligations between spouses beyond the breakdown of a marriage, reflects that relational
thinking. 28 A remedy that recognizes and responds to the fact that spouses shape their
relationship and its economic consequences together, both exercising autonomy as

as a natural consequence to the inevitable interdependencies of marriage, may provide a
counterpoint to this critique.
26

See e.g. Robert Leckey, “Relational Contract and Other Models of Marriage” (2002)

40:2 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 [Leckey, “Relational Contract”]; Lucy-Ann Buckley,
“Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2015) 29:2
Canadian Journal of Family Law 251.
27

Milton C Regan, Alone Together (USA: Oxford University Press, 2999):

<http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=45328> at 166.
28

See Moge supra note 8; Bracklow, supra note 9; Leckey, “Relational Contract”, supra

note 26.
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influenced by the relationship,29 is most likely to treat the spouses as equals upon marriage
breakdown and to divide the economic losses due to marriage breakdown accordingly.
The Advisory Guidelines encompass the relational approach to marriage and
spousal support. This is clear from the “merger over time” theory that grounds their
“without child support” formula.30 Indeed, it reflects the relational idea that the spouses’
economic identities merge over time: “the longer they are married, the more their human
capital should be seen as intertwined rather than affixed to the individual spouse in whose
body it resides.”31 The theory of merger over time recognizes that “the longer the marriage,

29

See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and

Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 7.
30

The Advisory Guidelines, in addition to setting out the theory underlying the Canadian

law of spousal support, provide two mathematical formulas (primarily based on the
spouses’ incomes) meant to assist with calculating fitting awards – one for situations with
a concurrent child support obligation and one for situations without child support. For a
description of the “without child support” formula and the concept of merger over time,
see the Advisory Guidelines, supra note 1 at ch 7.
31

Stephen D Sugarman, “Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce” in Stephen D

Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay, eds, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990) 130 at 159, cited in Department of Justice Canada, Developing
Spousal Support Guidelines in Canada: Beginning the Discussion, Background Paper by
Professor Carol Rogerson (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2002) at 28 [“SSAG
Background Paper”].
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the longer the spouse in a dependent role has likely submerged her or his independent
identity and earning capacity into the marital collective,”32 thus reflecting the relational
principle that autonomy is exercised and identity constructed through our relationships.33
A spousal support theory grounded in relationships rather than individuals is more
likely to address spouses’ genuine experiences with family breakdown. In recognizing that
the marriage relationship usually gives rise to continuing economic obligations, the remedy
should ensure not that spouses are treated identically by the law, but instead, that they
experience the law in genuinely equal ways.34 In offering arguments in support of judicial

32

Sugarman, supra note 31 at 160.

33

See Nedelsky, supra note 29; Jonathan Herring, Relational Autonomy and Family Law

(Oxford, UK: Springer, 2014).
34

The emphasis on spouses’ experience of the law, rather than their treatment by it, aims

to capture the idea that the spousal support remedy, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
is anchored in a substantive, rather than formal, approach to gender equality. As such, the
required analysis does not look at whether a law treats people in equal ways, but instead,
at the “outcomes of a … law or action” and at the “social and economic context” of a
particular claim. See Hon Lynn Smith & William Black, “The Equality Rights” (2013) 62
Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 301 at 303. Applied to spousal support, see e.g. Susan
B Boyd & Claire FL Young, “Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family Feuds and
Taxing Times” (2004) 42:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 545 (in Moge, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that the “spousal support provisions must be interpreted and applied in a
manner consistent with constitutional equality standards” — that is, in line with the

13
reliance on the Advisory Guidelines — a tool for promoting substantive equality through a
relational approach to marriage breakdown — this paper aligns with the broader feminist
pursuit of economic gender equality.35
2. Judicial scepticism, the Advisory Guidelines, and soft law
The judicial objection to reliance on the Advisory Guidelines seems to be based
primarily on their non-legislated character and the idea that they do not represent the will

“Charter guarantees of gender equality, interpreted as substantive equality” at 557)
[Boyd & Young, “Feminism”].
35

It is worth noting that certain developments in Canadian matrimonial law, such as the

legalization of same-sex marriage, have been viewed some as eroding earlier feminist
progress in family law. See e.g. Claire Young & Susan Boyd, “Losing the Feminist
Voice? Debates on The Legal Recognition of Same Sex Partnerships in Canada” (2006)
14:2 Feminist Legal Studies 213. The gender-neutral language of the Advisory Guidelines
(as well as the Divorce Act), might give rise to a similar difficulty, particularly given the
broad basis for entitlement for spousal support following Bracklow and the increased
potential for orders against high-earning women, simply on the basis of income disparity
and without a proper inquiry into entitlement. See e.g. Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow”, supra
note 6 (on the broad basis for entitlement to support). While that is a real possibility that
may unfairly affect some women, this article nevertheless maintains that as the majority
of spousal support claimants are women in vulnerable economic positions, as a tool that
brings some certainty to a previously unpredictable area of law meant to remedy that
position, the Advisory Guidelines, on balance, benefit women.
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of our democratically elected and politically accountable representatives. 36 Before
responding to that objection, this Part suggests that the Advisory Guidelines are best
described as an instrument of soft law. It then sets out the critiques of the Advisory
Guidelines, which echo typical critiques of soft law in the administrative context. Last it
unpacks the objection as grounded in a concern about the constitutional legitimacy of
judicial reliance on an informal, non-legislated tool.
2.1. Soft law outside the administrative context
The Advisory Guidelines may be best characterized as an instrument of soft law. In
the administrative context, the use of soft law is widespread, although to date, the practice
has not been the subject of much scholarly attention.37 Where it has been considered in the

36

Note that in Quebec, the objection also relates to the content of the Advisory Guidelines

and the application of federal legislation in a civil law jurisdiction. See e.g. Jocelyn Jarry
et al, “Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de penions alimentaires pour époux —
Pertinence de leur application au Québec?” (2016) 31:2 Canadian Journal of Law &
Society 243. Specifically, Quebec authorities have taken issue with the fact that Advisory
Guidelines typically place a term on support awards, a practice Quebec courts have not
historically followed. As this paper deals with the constitutional objection premised on
the informal nature of the Advisory Guidelines — that is, the objection more clearly
emanating from common law courts — it will not weigh in on the substantive objection
in Quebec. I anticipate addressing the Quebec question in future work.
37

But see Lorne Sossin, “Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines

and the Role of the Courts in Regulating Government” (2003) 40:3 Alberta Law Review
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Canadian context, soft law, at its most general, is typically understood as a tool for
“guidance as to how to exercise broad discretionary authority.” 38 Lorne Sossin writes,
“[soft] law encompasses non-legislative instruments such as policy guidelines, technical
manuals, rules, codes, operational memoranda, training materials, [and] interpretive
bulletins….”39 Daniel Mockle adds strategic plans, user guides, standards, and codes of
conduct.40 As with the Advisory Guidelines, administrative soft law “[typically … takes] a
statutory power or powers as a point of departure and [elaborates] how that discretion
should be exercised in different factual settings.”41 Significantly, given its informal nature,
administrative soft law, “cannot in theory bind decision-makers….”42 As with the Advisory

867 [Sossin, “Hard Choices”]; Sossin, “Discretion Unbound” supra note 7; Angela
Campbell & Kathleen Cranley Glass, “The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies,
Codes, and Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research” (2001) 46:2 McGill Law
Journal 473; France Houle, “La zone fictive de l’infra-droit : l’intégration des règles
administratives dans la catégorie des textes réglementaires” (2001) 47:1 McGill Law
Journal 161; Anna di Robilant, “Genealogies of Soft Law” (2006) 54:3 American Journal
of Comparative Law 499.
38

Sossin, “Discretion Unbound”, supra note 7 at 466.

39

Ibid 466-67.

40

Daniel Mockle, La gouvernance, le droit et l’État : La question du droit dans la

gouvernance publique (Brussells: Bruylant, 2007) at 108.
41

Sossin, “Hard Choices”, supra note 37 at 868-69.

42

Ibid at 869.
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Guidelines in certain jurisdictions, however, this fact has not inhibited the influence of nonbinding guidelines: “… in practice [soft law] often has as much or more influence than
legislative standards.”43
The increasing influence of soft law, both in Canada and abroad might be attributed
to the growth of the administrative state and the rise of administrative agencies — that is,
the rise of ministerial decision-making, outside of the courts.44 Whereas courts, as a general
matter, rely on statutes — both primary legislation and regulations — the growth of
administrative decision-making has brought with it the “increasing practice of regulation
by administrative rather than statutory rules.”45 Thus, many “regulatory regimes … rely
heavily on codes of practice, guidance, and circulars, which are often of indeterminate legal
status.”46 The unofficial nature of the Advisory Guidelines might be understood as placing
them in the same “indeterminate” category.
The parallels between administrative soft law and the Advisory Guidelines are
many. Importantly, both “may be seen as a bridge spanning the divide between statutory
authority, on the one hand, and discretionary judgement, on the other.”47 Both “[implicate]

43

Ibid.

44

See Christopher McCrudden, “Regulations and Thatcherism: Some British

Observations on Instrument Choice and Administrative Law” (1990) 40:3 University of
Toronto Law Journal 542.
45

Ibid at 546.

46

Ibid.

47

Sossin, “Discretion Unbound”, supra note 7 at 474.
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some form of normative commitment, [but] do not rely on binding rules or on a regime of
formal sanctions.”48 Similar as they are, however, a crucial distinction — one that might
form the basis of judicial resistance to the Advisory Guidelines — merits mention. While
administrative guidelines and policies are “not laws passed by the legislature,” they
nevertheless typically have their source in government.49 Unlike the Advisory Guidelines,
administrative soft law is often issued by government departments, ministries and “publicsector institutions” to guide decision-making in those places.

50

In other words,

administrative soft law is “developed by and applicable to unelected officials exercising
public authority.”51 Conversely, the Advisory Guidelines do not stem from government.
They were written by two family law professors, under the aegis of the federal Department
of Justice, in consultation with a committee of family law practitioners and judges. Further,
unlike administrative guidelines, which guide the decisions of bureaucrats acting on behalf
of the executive branch, the Advisory Guidelines are designed to guide judges, as well as
lawyers and litigants, in determining spousal support pursuant to a broad statutory grant of
discretion.
While the distinctions between administrative soft law and the Advisory Guidelines
might appear significant, they should not be overstated. In truth, their parallels are stronger
than their differences. While Sossin’s work focuses on the administrative state and the

48

di Robilant, supra note 37 at 499.

49

Sossin, “Hard Choices”, supra note 37 at 868.

50

Ibid.

51

Ibid.
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decision-making powers of the executive, there is no reason to limit the practice of
administrative reliance on similar policies and internal guidelines to state actors. Nonlegislated instruments aimed at guiding the exercise of discretion are created and used
outside of government as well. In the Canadian healthcare context, for example, conduct is
often guided by soft law.52 In the medical context, soft law has been defined as “[standards]
that are not enacted in law or regulation,” which lack a “definitive legal status,” and which
“affect the behaviour of health care professionals.”53 Given its non-legislated character,
this form of soft law may likewise be disregarded by a court, although in practice judges
lacking expertise in medical fields will often defer to its contents.54
Outside of Canada, examples and definitions of soft law are even broader. In the
United States, judges regularly rely on the non-legislated American Law Institute
Restatements.55 Much like the Advisory Guidelines, ALI Restatements “are not law, but
they are influential.”56 Created by a committee of “prominent judges, attorneys, and law
professors,” ALI Restatements have been produced since 1923, with the goal of responding

52

See Campbell & Cranley Glass, supra note 37.

53

Ibid at 475.

54

Ibid at 476.

55

See e.g. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Torts (St Paul,

Minn: American Law Institute Publishers, 1979); American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law, Third: Agency (St Paul, Minn: American Law Institute Publishers, 2006).
56

Shawn G Nevers, “Restatements: An Influential Secondary Source” (2013) 42:2

Student Lawyer 19 at 19.
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to the perceived “uncertainty and complexity” of American law — defects understood to
have “produced a general dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.”57 They cover
an array of subjects, such as torts, contracts, and employment law.58 The ALI Restatements
are considered “persuasive authority by many courts,”59 in spite of not being legislated.60
In the European Union context, Anna di Robilant describes academics taking the
lead in the development of soft law.61 She describes soft law initiatives as a “decentralized”
process of governance, “yielding voluntary guidelines and standards rather than

57

Kristen David Adams, “The Folly of Uniformity?” Lessons from the Restatement

Movement” (2004) 33:2 Hofstra Law Review 423 at 432-433.
58

See “Restatements of the Law”, American Law Institute:

<https://www.ali.org/publications/#publication-type-restatements>.
59

Meg Kribble, “Secondary Sources: ALRs, Encyclopedias, Law Reviews, Restatements,

& Treatises”, Harvard Law School Library:
<https://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309942&p=2070280>.
60

But see: Kristen David Adams, “Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the

Common Law” (2007) 40:2 Indiana Law Review 205 (setting out some common
critiques of the Restatements and suggesting that such “criticisms … should be more
accurately presented as critiques of the common-law court system” at 207).
61

See di Robilant, supra note 37 at 500. See also Vanitha Sundra-Karean, “In Defense of

Soft Law and Public-Private Initiatives: A Means to an End? — The Malaysian Case”
(2011) 12:2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 465.

20
compulsory regulation.”62 In France, non-legislated guidelines structure discretion in areas
as diverse as parental contributions to a child’s education and maintenance upon divorce
and the portion of the cost of public housing for the elderly to be paid by a resident’s
family. 63 Despite their creation outside of government, the Advisory Guidelines are
accordingly best characterized as an instrument of soft law, albeit a unique one in Canada,
where soft law tools are for the most part limited to the administrative context, whether
emanating from the state or some other policy-making body.
2.2. Judicial objections to the Advisory Guidelines
Judicial objections to reliance on the Advisory Guidelines express a specific set of
concerns, similar to those raised by decision-making based on administrative soft law. The
most vocal objections to the Advisory Guidelines have come from Quebec, where trial
judges’ approaches to them have ranged from doubt to hostility. In 2005, they were
described as “mere commentary,” a clear indication of judicial attitudes to come.64 One
year later, they were rejected on the basis that the court is not a “research laboratory” or
“testing ground,” again an allusion to their unofficial character. 65 Despite a strong

62

di Robilant, supra note 37 at 504.

63

See Alice Gouttefangeas, “Des barèmes de calcul de la participation des familles au

financement de l’hébergement des personnes âgées en institution” in Isabelle Sayn, ed, Le
droit mis en barèmes? (Paris: Dalloz, 2014) 37.
64

MF v NC, 2005 CanLII 13719 (QC CS).

65

BD v SDu, 2006 QCCS 1033 at para 20.
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endorsement of the Advisory Guidelines by the Quebec Court of Appeal in 2011,66 attitudes
among trial judges remained unchanged. Quebec trial judges have consistently reminded
us that the Advisory Guidelines are not law and that reliance on them would constitute an
unacceptable shortcut, akin to illegitimately circumventing the statutory analysis set out in
the Divorce Act.67
Alberta’s courts, while not as strident in their critique as some Quebec judges, have
expressed similar reservations about the Advisory Guidelines. Unlike neighbouring British
Columbia, where they have been analogized to authority,68 judges in Alberta appear firmly
of the view that courts are under no obligation to justify a decision to depart from the
Advisory Guidelines, because they are not law, 69 and continue to emphasize that they
“cannot be used as a formula or software tool.”70 In 2014, a unanimous Alberta Court of
Appeal accepted the use of the Advisory Guidelines as a “useful ‘cross‑check’ or ‘starting
point’ for spousal support, that might increase the consistency and predictability of
awards.”71 But, referring to the rejection, in Moge, of a “magic recipe” for determining
support, it would not rely on them to avoid the “difficult analysis [required by] the Divorce
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Act.”72 In Alberta, then, the Advisory Guidelines are understood as neither mandatory, nor
having force of law: “They are a useful tool … [but] do not and should not truly fetter a
trial judge’s discretion.”73 Moreover, their utility might be more pronounced outside of the
courtroom, where they may “encourage settlement and allow parties to ‘anticipate their
support responsibilities at the time of separation.’”74
The same is true in Nova Scotia, where, despite their slow integration by trial
judges, the consistent message from the Court of the Appeal is that “[since] the law does
not oblige the judge to apply the [Advisory Guidelines],” there is no error in law in a trial
judge choosing not to use them. 75 That statement is in stark contrast with the British
Columbia Court of Appeal’s reasoning that failure to consider the Advisory Guidelines or
justify departing from them when they are argued may constitute an error in law.76 More
recent cases in Nova Scotia have emphasized the non-binding nature of the Advisory
Guidelines and referred to them as a “reference” for courts.77
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These examples illustrate that the judicial refusal to rely on the Advisory Guidelines
appears grounded, for the most part, in their unofficial and non-binding status. Given the
unique nature of the Advisory Guidelines as an unofficial tool meant to guide judicial
determinations, the status-based objection is not unreasonable. The Advisory Guidelines
constitute a novel approach to structuring or curtailing statutorily mandated judicial
discretion and, as such, they should be approached with care. But a nuanced or careful
approach need not mean closed-mindedness to new regulatory techniques, given the
proliferation of similar alternatives to legislation throughout the legal and political
system. 78 Of course, any understanding of the motives for judicial resistance to the
Advisory Guidelines will be limited by the content of judicial pronouncements concerning
them. Moreover, it is possible that resistance might be rooted in judicial attitudes relative
to the function of the spousal support remedy itself; it may not be a coincidence that prior
to the creation of the Advisory Guidelines, spousal support awards in Nova Scotia and
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Alberta seemed to place more weight on the goal of self-sufficiency,79 with the result that
judges were more likely to award support for shorter durations than their counterparts in
other provinces.80 Nevertheless, a response to judicial attitudes can only answer to they
way are expressed — here, as objecting to the illegitimacy of judicial reliance on the
informal and non-binding Advisory Guidelines.
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2.3. Unpacking the objection
Given the similarity between the Advisory Guidelines and administrative soft law,
it is not surprising that objections to deferential approaches to the latter tend to echo judicial
objections to the Advisory Guidelines. Sossin captures the objection when he writes:
Legislation and Regulations are subject to Parliamentary accountability and
procedural formality…. Soft law is subject to no such criteria. Courts cannot
treat guidelines as law because to do so would recognize that public
administration is subject to laws of its own design, which would offend
Canada's constitutional separation of powers.81
Granted, the objection, as Sossin describes it, applies to reliance on soft law by the
executive branch of government, in administering government programs. But it is rooted
in the same concern as judicial objections to the non-legislated status of the Advisory
Guidelines — they are not law and reliance on them defies the unwritten constitutional
principle of the separation of powers.
The separation of powers is a “defining feature” of Canada’s Constitution. 82
Whereas “the role of the judiciary is … to interpret and apply the law; the role of the
legislature is to decide upon and enunciate policy.”83 Moreover, the separation of powers
is inherent in the Canadian constitutional principle of Parliamentary democracy — that is,
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the “ultimate truth … that fundamental matters of political choice are left to the
legislature….”84 Objections to the application of the Advisory Guidelines on the basis that
they are not legislated are thus ostensibly rooted in the principle that legislative policy
should emanate from democratically elected lawmakers, and nowhere else.
Resistance to soft law reflects two related concerns. First, as seen, a concern for
respect for the foundational constitutional principle of the rule of law and the requirement
“that the exercise of all public power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule.”85 At
stake, then, for judges whose refusal to apply the Advisory Guidelines based on their
informal nature, is a potential affront to the rule of law, and the requirement that all
government action comply with the law. 86 As the judiciary is a branch of Canadian
government, the objection implies that it would be contrary to constitutional principles for
courts to rely on normative instruments that do not conform to rule of law, “the root of our
system of government.”87 As discussed below, however, the rule of law may be understood
as something broader than these narrow judicial statements suggest.
The second difficulty with judicial deference to soft law instruments has not been
explicitly addressed by judges approaching the Advisory Guidelines, but it is grounded in
similar concerns about constitutional legitimacy. Because administrative soft law is, as a
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general matter, both “developed and applied by the bureaucracy, it is not subject to the
accountability measures applicable to legislation and regulations.”88 Legislation — both
primary statutes and the regulations adopted under them — may be subjected to judicial
review and evaluated for Charter compliance. Indeed, “they must be enacted or issued in
a particular fashion, published in a particular form, vetted for compliance with
constitutional strictures, and are subject to Parliamentary debate.”89 Soft law, however,
which “[elaborates] the legal standards and political values underlying bureaucratic
decision-making,”90 with potentially serious impacts on the individuals subject to it, is not
subject to the same constraints.91 Indeed, the absence of “requirements governing [its]
content and the process by which [it is] developed and disseminated” might seriously
undermine its legitimacy as the basis for determining outcomes.92
As a tool for guiding discretionary determinations, the Advisory Guidelines, like
administrative soft law, are thought to “enhance coherence and accountability.” 93 By
providing a clearer structure for spousal support determinations, the Advisory Guidelines
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“[make] the basis for discretionary decisions more transparent.”94 And by requiring judges
to justify departures from the formulas, they create a sense of accountability on the part of
decision-makers.95 However, the same absence of procedural and constitutional constraints
on administrative soft law might be seen as effectively allowing “public authority to be
exercised according to internal and sometimes secret principles and policies, not subject to
a fair and accountable process of development or meaningful forms of public review.”96
Indeed, where soft law materials are reviewed by courts — typically in the administrative
context — they are normally not scrutinized for Charter compliance.97 Accordingly, just
as judicial reliance on a non-legislated regulatory instrument might be understood as
threatening basic constitutional principles, the absence of procedural accountability might
likewise “[undermine] both the integrity of public administration and the rule of law.”98
The rule of law is a foundational element of Canada’s political and legal system
and regulatory tools must conform to it. As seen, however, using alternatives to legislation
is routine, both within the regulatory state and in the context of dispute resolution. 99
Accordingly, rather than resistance, what is needed is a means of viewing soft law as
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respecting constitutional requirements.100 In the case of spousal support, the question thus
becomes whether there is merit to judicial objections to the Advisory Guidelines based on
their unofficial status or whether, instead, it is possible to understand reliance on this kind
of instrument as adhering to the rule of law. The next Part suggests that it is.
3. Thick constitutionalism: the procedural rule of law and democratic legitimacy
Resistance to the Advisory Guidelines based on the idea that judicial reliance on
them offends the separation of powers is rooted in a thin understanding of the Constitution.
The objection outlined above regards the Constitution as “rule-based” and “takes [the]
principal site of operation [of constitutions] to be the constitutional or highest court.”101
The narrow, or formal, understanding of the rule of law, as set out by the Supreme Court,
consists of three basic elements. First, the supremacy of the law over government and
citizens;102 second, “the rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order
of positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative
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order;”103 and, third, as seen, any exercise of state power must be grounded in a legal
rule. 104 Grounded, as it is, in their non-legislated form, the critique of the Advisory
Guidelines reflects a view of law as “exclusively the product of a hierarchical relationship
between the legislative, executive, and judicial mechanisms of the state,” and represents a
reductionist view of law.105 In doing so, it ignores a richer, or thicker understanding of
constitutions, one which “[understands] legality to be sustained not ‘solely by the formal
law of the Constitution, legislative statutes [or] court decisions,’” but as something
“embedded in and [which] emerges out of daily activities.”106
Instead of limiting understanding of a particular instrument to the narrow
formalities associated with a thin conception of the rule of law, thick constitutionalism
enables the incorporation of pluralistic understandings of law and legality. Whereas the
thin conception of the principle insists on grounding legality in rules and precedent, and
thus responds only slowly to changing social needs and circumstances,
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constitutionalism is released from formal constraints and accepting of novel approaches to
legal problems. Importantly, a thick understanding of the Constitution “may reject a strict
division between legislation and interpretation….”108 Such an understanding would have
important implications on the normative force of a soft law instrument like the Advisory
Guidelines, the purpose of which is to aid in interpreting the legislation on spousal support.
A thick understanding of constitutional requirements is not distracted by the formal
features of soft law. It thus creates space for inquiry beyond form, and opens avenues to
explore more meaningful questions, such as the distributive or discriminatory effects of a
particular regulatory scheme or instrument.109
The thick conception of the rule of law is not without controversy. Indeed, the
narrower conception is regularly espoused by courts and constitutional scholars. Peter
Hogg writes, “[the] most obvious feature of a democracy is that the laws are made by
legislatures whose members are elected.”110 As “an ideal of constitutional legality,” the
rule of law requires “open, stable, clear, and general rules, even-handed enforcement of
those laws [and] the independence of the judiciary.” 111 Instruments that flout these
requirements cannot be seen as constitutionally legitimate. The narrow conception of the
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rule of law, however, has also been described as “an emotion, an aspiration, an ideal,”
lacking a foothold in reality, where it has been consistently rejected by “all governments
of the world.”112 It is a version, in other words, abstracted from its social, political and
historical contexts.
This Part suggests that viewing the Advisory Guidelines from the thicker,
procedural rule of law perspective enables the acceptance of judicial reliance on the
Advisory Guidelines as a legitimate means of furthering the objectives of the Divorce Act,
without compromising Canada’s constitutional structure. It first sets out the procedural
conception of the rule of law, according to which validity depends not solely on an
instrument’s form, but on the procedure leading up to its creation. It then suggests that
judicial reliance on the Advisory Guidelines might fulfill the promise of the procedural rule
of law. The analysis contained here is not limited to the Advisory Guidelines; importantly,
the lessons about the democratic nature of recognizing the normative force of certain nonlegislated instruments might be adapted to other novel forms of soft law, aimed at
remedying interpretive difficulties and advancing rights, provided that those instruments
meet the requirements of the procedural rule of law.
3.1. The rule of law as a rule of procedure
Looking beyond thin constitutionalism means conceiving of the principle of the
rule of law as something more than a requirement of form and authorship. Even staunch
defenders of parliamentary supremacy and the constitutional principle of the separation of
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powers will admit that the rule of law is about more than predictability.113 Jeremy Waldron
writes that the rule of law encompasses procedural elements that might be in tension with
“the ideal of formal predictability.”114 According to this broader conception of the rule of
law, the principle implies a certain procedure, or “mode of governance that allows people
a voice, a way of intervening on their own behalf in confrontations with power.”115 For
Waldron, then, adherence to the rule of law depends on the democratic procedures
underlying normative instruments; the rule of law is respected when policy making and
public administration include “opportunities for active engagement.”116
The procedural conception of the rule of law connects legitimacy with a belief in
the democratic character of certain processes. Under this model, a regulatory tool will
conform to the constitutional principle as long as a designated person, or group of people,
participate in its creation, and provided they follow pre-established processes. 117 In
Waldron’s model, that group of people is the elected legislature.118 More specifically, it is
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the legislature, engaging in “principled dialogue,” on behalf of the citizenry. 119 The
procedural view of the rule of law does not depend on the substance, or content, of a
normative instrument. Provided it was arrived at through a specific process, proponents of
this view will accept the fairness of a decision, or policy choice, even where they disagree
with its content or outcome. That “process-based response,” which accepts decisions
independent of their outcome, “is the theory of political legitimacy.”120 Legitimacy, then,
depends on legislative procedures.
The legitimacy of legislation is rooted not only in its representative nature, but also
in the deliberative and participatory processes associated with democratic debate. Thus
arguments in favour of legislative supremacy are based on the “quality of public
deliberation.”121 Participation is seen as “valuable because of the importance of assembling
diverse perspectives and experiences” in public decision-making, and “because the sheer
experience of arguing in circumstances of human plurality helps us develop more
interesting and probably more valid opinions than we could manufacture on our own.”122
Thus, underlying the authority of legislation “is a sense that discussion and validation by a
large assembly of representatives is indispensable to the recognition of a general measure
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of principle or policy as law.”123 As legislators participate in that discussion in place of
their constituents, the procedural conception of the rule of law promotes “respect for the
freedom and dignity of each person as an active intelligence.”124
Otherwise conceived of, the procedural understanding of the rule of law grounds
legitimacy in representative democracy and the collective deliberation of elected
representatives. Similar to the Habermasian notion of deliberative democracy, legitimacy
derives from the fact that those who exercise legislative power “do so on the presumption
that their decisions represent an impartial standpoint that is equally in the interest of all.”125
That presumption rests on the idea that “decisions [are] the result of appropriate public
processes of deliberation,” wherein individual participate and question equally and may
raise arguments about both the substance of a decision, as well as the procedures of
decision-making.126 Under this model, legitimacy, in the context of “collective decision
making processes in a polity,” is conditional on the fact that “the institutions of this polity
are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes
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of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal
individuals.” 127 Procedural rule of law, then, presumes the legitimacy of legislative
instruments as resulting from the participation, in their creation, of representatives of the
diverse citizenry. Moreover, legislatures debate questions from the broadest of
perspectives. The diversity and representative nature of legislative assemblies means that
lawmakers are meant to be able to take multiple and diverging views into account when
interpreting rights and determining their content.128 In consequence, regulatory tools that,
like the Advisory Guidelines, do not result from the legislative process fail to promote the
freedom and dignity of the people subject to them; judicial reliance on them constitutes an
affront to the procedural rule of law.
The procedural rule of law represents a broader conception of the principle than
that espoused by Canadian courts and seemingly at the root of the judicial objection to the
Advisory Guidelines. But it is still grounded in a strict separation of powers, which
understands constitutional legitimacy as connected in part with legislative supremacy.
Where spousal support is concerned, however, the legislative process has undermined
rather than furthered the rule of law; the diversity of judicial interpretations of the statutory

127

Ibid at 746-747, citing Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic

Legitimacy”, in Seyla Benhabib, ed, Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries
of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 67 at 69.
128

See Jeremy Waldron, “Judges as Moral Reasoners” (2009) 7:2 International Journal of

Constitutional Law 2; Waldon, “Against Judicial Review”, supra note 117.

37
remedy created confusion and uncertainty. 129 The spousal support provisions of the
Divorce Act set out four objectives that an award might aim to achieve. The first three
might be understood as recognizing and remedying economic advantages and
disadvantages resulting from the roles of the spouses during the marriage, and their
resulting economic positions upon marriage breakdown.130 The fourth, referenced above,
paints spousal support as a tool for promoting self-sufficiency on the part of each spouse.131
Aside from the tempered nature of the goal of self-sufficiency, however, the legislation
does little to guide judges in selecting among the different objectives to craft an appropriate
award. In other words, the legislative process that led to the adoption of the spousal support
provisions of the Divorce Act did not result in a clear endorsement of a particular
conception of a right — here, the right to equality132 — as legislatures are said to do.133
In light of the contradictory and confusing nature of the remedy prior to the release
of the Advisory Guidelines, Canadian spousal support law might be described as selfdefeating, from a systemic perspective. Indeed, the legislation fulfills Cass Sunstein’s
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description of a “regulatory paradox” — that is, a “self-defeating regulatory [strategy that
achieves] an end precisely opposite to the one intended.” 134 While the spousal support
provisions adopted in 1985 might have been an improvement over their predecessors —
providing, as they do, minimal guidance to judges determining support — it cannot be said
that they were very successful at remedying the devastating economic consequences of
marriage breakdown on many women. As seen, in the absence of the Advisory Guidelines,
the discretionary awarding of spousal support often resulted in disproportionately negative
economic effects on divorcing women, attributable to the sense of inconsistency and
unpredictability of the remedy.
That the spousal support provisions of the Divorce Act should constitute a
regulatory paradox is unsurprising; similar broad and heavily fact-dependent discretionary
grants have likewise been known to undermine their objectives. Determining the “best
interests of the child” in custody cases, for example, is understood by some to constitute a
disservice to children “because of the enormous time spent in resolving the complicated
factual question.”135 Particularly significant is the belief that legislation invoking principles
of formal equality in family law matters might produce “less rather than more in the way
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of real equality between men and women.”136 Indeed, “a formal constitutional guarantee of
equality does not go very far toward achieving justice.”137
The Divorce Act directs judges to look at the details of a couple’s relationship when
determining support. But the legislation is gender neutral, and it was not until the Supreme
Court set out the compensatory approach to spousal support in Moge v Moge that trial
judges awarding support began to systemically consider the demonstrated socio-economic
impacts of family breakdown on women.138 The Court thus recognized that “[when] two
groups are differently situated, a legal requirement that they be treated the same seems a
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perverse method of promoting equality between them.” 139 Specifically, it found that
judges, in order to be responsive to the “equality implications of their interpretation of the
relevant provision … may need to examine the factual social and economic context in
which a particular piece of legislation operates.”140 In short, it confirmed that a formal
approach to gender equality will often have the effect of further disadvantaging women.
Further, while the Supreme Court, in Moge, interpreted the remedy in the spirit of
substantive equality, later interpretations resulted in confusion and unpredictability. Thus,
the Canadian legislation on spousal support is characteristic of a regulatory paradox, where
“legal controls have been self-defeating.”141
Thickening the principle of the rule of law to take into account the procedures
underlying legislation does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of legislative
or regulatory paradoxes, which, while perhaps procedurally sound, defeat rather than
promote their objectives. In the case of spousal support, the relevant provisions of the
Divorce Act may have been properly adopted by the legislature, but their competing
objectives and factors, prior to the advent of the Advisory Guidelines, did little to improve
the fate of divorcing women. As the following section suggests, however, the procedural
conception of the rule of law might still hold promise for recognizing the normative force
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of the Advisory Guidelines, and for similar soft law tools, provided their creation respects
the tenets of the constitutional principle.
3.2. Can the Advisory Guidelines further the procedural rule of law?
The Advisory Guidelines are one example of where recognizing the normative force
of soft law might be understood as respecting the procedural rule of law. Indeed, the
creation of the Advisory Guidelines, relying on the input of various actors and stakeholders
representing different factions of society, suggest that the pillars of deliberative democracy
may be better upheld in the non-legislative context. Procedural legitimacy, in other words,
may not lie exclusively in legislated instruments.
One of the principal critiques of political decision-making and legislating is that
favouring interest groups and concentrating power in to the “hands of a few” effectively
“[locks citizens] out of the key decision-making structures.”142 Democracy is said to suffer
as a result. 143 Even Waldron admits that “both representative authority and judicial
authority involve the exercise of political power at some remove from the participation of
ordinary citizens.”144 Moreover, political decision-making often fails to adhere to the “four
pillars of deliberation” — that is, to the “four consistently articulated criteria for a
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discussion to be considered fully deliberative.” 145 These are: consensus; reason, or an
“orientation to the public good … [taking] into account in a fundamental way the
perspective of others;” rational discussion; and equality of participation, unconstrained by
the existing distribution of social resources.146 That failure to align with these “standards
against which a decision-making process can be measured to determine that process's
legitimacy…”147 undermines the legitimacy of political decision-making from a procedural
rule of law perspective.148 As seen earlier, however, these standards were respected in the
creation of the Advisory Guidelines.
If reason and thoughtfulness are understood to be the hallmarks of the procedural
rule of law,149 it is difficult to impugn an instrument of soft law, the creation of which
appears to better fulfill the pillars of deliberative democracy than the Canadian legislative
system. Indeed, the process of creating the Advisory Guidelines embodied the markers of
procedural legitimacy. The authors sought consensus on the different aspects of the project;
the process took fundamental account of the diverse perspectives involved; the authors
engaged in rational discussions with the advisory group and other interested parties; and
equality of participation, unconstrained by social resources, seems to have been inherent
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in the authors’ travels throughout the country: instead of waiting for those with the
resources to reach out to them, the authors actively sought out the views of different voices.
Moreover, unlike the legislative process,150 their process of creation suggested openness to
change and continuous revision, until all participants agreed that the Advisory Guidelines
constituted a proper reflection of the case law, taking into account regional and cultural
differences across geographic lines. All of this supports the idea that procedural legitimacy
— that is, respect for the procedural conception of the rule of law — might well lie in
informal tools like the Advisory Guidelines.
The imperfect nature of the legislative system,151 together with the demonstrated
defects with judicial discretion in the spousal support context,152 illustrate that the relevant
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provisions of the Divorce Act may not adhere to the procedural conception of the rule of
law. Informed by the reasoning underlying the procedural conception, that failure might be
described as a lack of democratic accountability with respect to the law of spousal support.
The Advisory Guidelines, however, might represent a means of restoring that
accountability. In the administrative context, Sossin writes that “better statutory guidance
in crafting discretionary powers is desirable from the standpoint of democratic
accountability.” 153 Although they are not a legislative creation, or even statutorily
mandated, the Advisory Guidelines relieve some of the demonstrated problems with the
spousal support remedy, while their creation adhered to democratic and deliberative
principles. Thus, the Advisory Guidelines respond to the process-based critique of soft law
set out above.154 In this sense, the Advisory Guidelines might be likened to the American
ALI Restatements, the normative force of which has been attributed to the “fair,
deliberative, and democratic” nature of the process of their creation and review. 155
Moreover, given the “chaotic” nature of family law156 — what Rogerson describes as “the
fragmentation of the modern family law system” — it is easy to understand how this kind
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of normative instrument might be better “generated by various legal actors, not only by
legislators….”157 In the administrative context, decisions taken under a statutory grant of
discretion are regularly based on soft law. Provided these tools correspond with
constitutional values — for example, by incorporating an equality-based analysis grounded
in the Charter and being the subject of meaningful deliberation about their content —
reliance on them by judges need not be viewed as a threat to the rule of law.
Acknowledging the legitimacy, from a procedural rule of law perspective, of
judicial reliance on soft law may thus serve to refute the rule of law objection to the
Advisory Guidelines. While they are not legislated, reliance on the Advisory Guidelines
may still be seen as fulfilling the requirements of a thicker understanding of the rule of law.
Proceduralists concerned about the creation of normative instruments might look at the
“input legitimacy” of the Advisory Guidelines.158 As seen, their creation used mechanisms
normally associated with successful deliberation, such as leadership and stakes in the
outcome.159 Moreover, as in the administrative context, as an instrument “forged through
a process of hearings or negotiation involving all relevant interests,” the Advisory
Guidelines have a “strong claim to legitimacy” from the procedural point of view. 160
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Indeed, as predicted by Rogerson,161 the type of participation by interested stakeholders in
the creation of the Advisory Guidelines is understood to create a better framework for
decision-making than what would emerge from the common law process of the lengthy
and gradual accretion of precedent.162 As far as the procedural conception of the rule of
law is concerned, there may by little merit in impugning judicial reliance on the Advisory
Guidelines simply because they are not legislated. Thus, a thicker conception of the
constitutional principle — one grounded in procedure — might make space for informal
normative instruments and has the potential to facilitate the pursuit of equality that
underlies the spousal support remedy.

administrative soft law, and the creation of policies and guidelines pursuant to a statutory
grant of ministerial discretion. The statement is nevertheless relevant insofar as it implies
that the legitimacy of a soft law instrument may depend less on its source (legislative,
academic, or bureaucratic) and more on the process of its creation, including the scope of
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Conclusion
This article does not purport to settle the meaning of the rule of law. Its much more
limited aim is to suggest that to reduce the constitutional principle to the formal
understanding expressed by the Supreme Court is to ignore the richness of the concept, and
its potential fruitfulness for examining the use of novel regulatory instruments such as soft
law. It also does not endorse any particular conception of the rule of law; attempts to answer
the question that has occupied scholars of jurisprudence for centuries would go far beyond
its scope. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate that contrary to the judicial objection expressed
in some provinces, pursuant to at least one conception of the rule of law, judicial reliance
on the Advisory Guideline might be understood as upholding, rather than offending, the
foundational constitutional principle. 163 Approaching the Advisory Guidelines from the
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perspective of the procedural rule of law might thus help to achieve the equality-based
objectives of the Divorce Act.
Scholarship on the Advisory Guidelines is scant. Their authors have written about
them for both international and Canadian audiences,164 and others have joined them in
addressing practical issues with respect to their use.165 Few, however, have examined them,

their conduct accordingly” at 233). Moreover, that this paper does not deal with
substantive conceptions of constitutionalism, and the relationship between the rule of law
and respect for rights, should not be read as rejecting such understandings of the
constitutional principle. See e.g. Aileen Kavanagh, “Participation and Judicial Review: A
Reply to Jeremy Waldron” (2003) 22:5 Law & Philosophy 451 (on the importance of
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from a theoretical perspective, with respect to their function or legitimacy.166 This paper
maintains that the Advisory Guidelines demonstrate the potential of soft law to fill gaps in
the law where statutes complicate rather than clarify, or fail to live up to their aspirations
of substantive equality, and the legislature is slow to respond. They provide a concrete
example of the idea that legislative reform is not the only way that guidelines, meant to
assist judges, lawyers, and laypeople alike, may be introduced.167 Further, viewing reliance
on the Advisory Guidelines as a constitutionally sound normative approach responds to the
call by family law scholars for “communicative and regulatory techniques that speak more
directly to the parties themselves” than legislation, which speaks primarily to lawyers and
courts.168 Those working outside of family law have posited a similar need for bottom-up,
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or “organic,” non-legislative development of the law, in order to avoid the instability of the
legislative approach 169 — the same instability that characterized spousal support
determinations pursuant to the broad legislative grant of discretion in the Divorce Act.
Moreover, viewing the Advisory Guidelines as a legitimate normative source would align
with the legal pluralist perspective, which sees guidelines and soft law not as contradictory
to legal activities as traditionally understood, but as an integrated part of those activities.170
A unique soft law tool in Canada, the Advisory Guidelines may do more than
advance the objectives of the spousal support provisions of the Divorce Act. Like similar
tools used abroad, they force a re-questioning of traditional conceptions of law and
justice.171 In doing so, they open up new understandings of legitimacy and expand the
existing pool of sources of normativity. With respect to spousal support, they may help
facilitate the pursuit of substantive economic equality across gender lines. In times of rapid
social and technological change, formal law will often be disconnected from social reality.
As it does in the context of spousal support, soft law can bridge the gap between formal
legislation and the lived reality of legal subjects, thus ensuring that the law promotes the
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rights and principles that underlie the Canadian justice system. But spousal support is just
one example of a place where soft law may help to promote respect for the rule of law.
Further research might reveal other areas where similar instruments might play an
important role in the lives of both jurists and ordinary citizens. Once it is accepted, as this
article has attempted to illustrate, that reliance on non-legislated guidelines, created by
parties other than government, does not inevitably undermine foundational constitutional
principles, the potential of soft law to contribute to the existing cache of normative
instruments is limited only by our creativity.

